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Abstract
Cloud computing promises to significantly change the way
we use computers and access and store our personal and busi-
ness information. With these new computing and communica-
tions paradigms arise new data security challenges. Existing
data protection mechanisms such as encryption have failed in
preventing data theft attacks, especially those perpetrated by
an insider to the cloud provider.
We propose a different approach for securing data in the
cloud using offensive decoy technology. We monitor data
access in the cloud and detect abnormal data access patterns.
When unauthorized access is suspected and then verified using
challenge questions, we launch a disinformation attack by
returning large amounts of decoy information to the attacker.
This protects against the misuse of the user’s real data.
Experiments conducted in a local file setting provide evidence
that this approach may provide unprecedented levels of user
data security in a Cloud environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Businesses, especially startups, small and medium busi-
nesses (SMBs), are increasingly opting for outsourcing data
and computation to the Cloud. This obviously supports better
operational efficiency, but comes with greater risks, perhaps
the most serious of which are data theft attacks.
Data theft attacks are amplified if the attacker is a malicious
insider. This is considered as one of the top threats to cloud
computing by the Cloud Security Alliance [1]. While most
Cloud computing customers are well-aware of this threat,
they are left only with trusting the service provider when it
comes to protecting their data. The lack of transparency into,
let alone control over, the Cloud provider’s authentication,
authorization, and audit controls only exacerbates this threat.
The Twitter incident is one example of a data theft at-
tack from the Cloud. Several Twitter corporate and per-
sonal documents were ex-filtrated to technological website
TechCrunch [2], [3], and customers’ accounts, including the
account of U.S. President Barack Obama, were illegally ac-
cessed [4], [5]. The attacker used a Twitter administrator’s
password to gain access to Twitter’s corporate documents,
hosted on Google’s infrastructure as Google Docs. The damage
was significant both for Twitter and for its customers.
While this particular attack was launched by an outsider,
stealing a customer’s admin passwords is much easier if
perpetrated by a malicious insider. Rocha and Correia outline
how easy passwords may be stolen by a malicious insider of
the Cloud service provider [6]. The authors also demonstrated
how Cloud customers’ private keys might be stolen, and how
their confidential data might be extracted from a hard disk.
After stealing a customer’s password and private key, the
malicious insider get access to all customer data, while the
customer has no means of detecting this unauthorized access.
Much research in Cloud computing security has focused
on ways of preventing unauthorized and illegitimate access to
data by developing sophisticated access control and encryption
mechanisms. However these mechanisms have not been able to
prevent data compromise. Van Dijk and Juels have shown that
fully homomorphic encryption, often acclaimed as the solution
to such threats, is not a sufficient data protection mechanism
when used alone [7].
We propose a completely different approach to securing the
cloud using decoy information technology, that we have come
to call Fog computing. We use this technology to launch
disinformation attacks against malicious insiders, preventing
them from distinguishing the real sensitive customer data from
fake worthless data. In this paper, we propose two ways of
using Fog computing to prevent attacks such as the Twitter
attack, by deploying decoy information within the Cloud by
the Cloud service customer and within personal online social
networking profiles by individual users.
II. SECURING CLOUDS WITH FOG
Numerous proposals for cloud-based services describe
methods to store documents, files, and media in a remote
service that may be accessed wherever a user may connect
to the Internet. A particularly vexing problem before such
services are broadly accepted concerns guarantees for securing
a user’s data in a manner where that guarantees only the user
and no one else can gain access to that data. The problem of
providing security of confidential information remains a core
security problem that, to date, has not provided the levels of
assurance most people desire.
Many proposals have been made to secure remote data in the
Cloud using encryption and standard access controls. It is fair
to say all of the standard approaches have been demonstrated
to fail from time to time for a variety of reasons, including in-
sider attacks, mis-configured services, faulty implementations,
buggy code, and the creative construction of effective and
sophisticated attacks not envisioned by the implementers of
security procedures [8]. Building a trustworthy cloud comput-
ing environment is not enough, because accidents continue to
happen, and when they do, and information gets lost, there is
no way to get it back. One needs to prepare for such accidents.
The basic idea is that we can limit the damage of stolen
data if we decrease the value of that stolen information
to the attacker. We can achieve this through a ‘preventive’
disinformation attack. We posit that secure Cloud services
can be implemented given two additional security features:
1) User Behavior Profiling: It is expected that access
to a user’s information in the Cloud will exhibit a
normal means of access. User profiling is a well known
technique that can be applied here to model how, when,
and how much a user accesses their information in the
Cloud. Such ‘normal user’ behavior can be continu-
ously checked to determine whether abnormal access
to a user’s information is occurring. This method of
behavior-based security is commonly used in fraud
detection applications. Such profiles would naturally
include volumetric information, how many documents
are typically read and how often. These simple user-
specific features can serve to detect abnormal Cloud
access based partially upon the scale and scope of data
transferred [9].
2) Decoys: Decoy information, such as decoy documents,
honeyfiles, honeypots, and various other bogus informa-
tion can be generated on demand and serve as a means
of detecting unauthorized access to information and
to ‘poison’ the thief’s ex-filtrated information. Serving
decoys will confound and confuse an adversary into
believing they have ex-filtrated useful information, when
they have not. This technology may be integrated with
user behavior profiling technology to secure a user’s
information in the Cloud. Whenever abnormal access
to a cloud service is noticed, decoy information may
be returned by the Cloud and delivered in such a
way as to appear completely legitimate and normal.
The true user, who is the owner of the information,
would readily identify when decoy information is being
returned by the Cloud, and hence could alter the Cloud’s
responses through a variety of means, such as challenge
questions, to inform the Cloud security system that it
has inaccurately detected an unauthorized access. In
the case where the access is correctly identified as an
unauthorized access, the Cloud security system would
deliver unbounded amounts of bogus information to
the adversary, thus securing the user’s true data from
unauthorized disclosure. The decoys, then, serve two
purposes: (1) validating whether data access is autho-
rized when abnormal information access is detected, and
(2) confusing the attacker with bogus information.
We posit that the combination of these two security features
will provide unprecedented levels of security for the Cloud. No
current Cloud security mechanism is available that provides
this level of security.
We have applied these concepts to detect illegitimate data
access to data stored on a local file system by masqueraders,
i.e. attackers who impersonate legitimate users after stealing
their credentials. One may consider illegitimate access to
Cloud data by a rogue insider as the malicious act of a
masquerader. Our experimental results in a local file system
setting show that combining both techniques can yield better
detection results, and our results suggest that this approach
may work in a Cloud environment, as the Cloud is intended
to be as transparent to the user as a local file system. In the
following we review briefly some of the experimental results
achieved by using this approach to detect masquerade activity
in a local file setting.
A. Combining User Behavior Profiling and Decoy Technology
for Masquerade Detection
1) User Behavior Profiling: Legitimate users of a computer
system are familiar with the files on that system and where
they are located. Any search for specific files is likely to be
targeted and limited. A masquerader, however, who gets access
to the victim’s system illegitimately, is unlikely to be familiar
with the structure and contents of the file system. Their search
is likely to be widespread and untargeted.
Based on this key assumption, we profiled user search
behavior and developed user models trained with a one-
class modeling technique, namely one-class support vector
machines. The importance of using one-class modeling stems
from the ability of building a classifier without having to share
data from different users. The privacy of the user and their data
is therefore preserved.
We monitor for abnormal search behaviors that exhibit de-
viations from the user baseline. According to our assumption,
such deviations signal a potential masquerade attack. Our pre-
vious experiments validated our assumption and demonstrated
that we could reliably detect all simulated masquerade attacks
using this approach with a very low false positive rate of
1.12% [9].
2) Decoy Technology: We placed traps within the file
system. The traps are decoy files downloaded from a Fog
computing site, an automated service that offers several types
of decoy documents such as tax return forms, medical records,
credit card statements, e-bay receipts, etc. [10]. The decoy
files are downloaded by the legitimate user and placed in
highly-conspicuous locations that are not likely to cause any
interference with the normal user activities on the system. A
masquerader, who is not familiar with the file system and its
contents, is likely to access these decoy files, if he or she is in
search for sensitive information, such as the bait information
embedded in these decoy files. Therefore, monitoring access
to the decoy files should signal masquerade activity on the
system. The decoy documents carry a keyed-Hash Message
Authentication Code (HMAC), which is hidden in the header
section of the document. The HMAC is computed over the
file’s contents using a key unique to each user. When a
decoy document is loaded into memory, we verify whether
the document is a decoy document by computing a HMAC
based on all the contents of that document. We compare it with
HMAC embedded within the document. If the two HMACs
match, the document is deemed a decoy and an alert is issued.
The advantages of placing decoys in a file system are three-
fold: (1) the detection of masquerade activity (2) the confusion
of the attacker and the additional costs incurred to distinguish
real from bogus information, and (3) the deterrence effect
which, although hard to measure, plays a significant role in
preventing masquerade activity by risk-averse attackers.
3) Combining the Two Techniques: The correlation of
search behavior anomaly detection with trap-based decoy
files should provide stronger evidence of malfeasance, and
therefore improve a detector’s accuracy. We hypothesize that
detecting abnormal search operations performed prior to an
unsuspecting user opening a decoy file will corroborate the
suspicion that the user is indeed impersonating another victim
user. This scenario covers the threat model of illegitimate
access to Cloud data. Furthermore, an accidental opening of
a decoy file by a legitimate user might be recognized as
an accident if the search behavior is not deemed abnormal.
In other words, detecting abnormal search and decoy traps
together may make a very effective masquerade detection
system. Combining the two techniques improves detection
accuracy.
We use decoys as an oracle for validating the alerts issued
by the sensor monitoring the user’s file search and access
behavior. In our experiments, we did not generate the decoys
on demand at the time of detection when the alert was issued.
Instead, we made sure that the decoys were conspicuous
enough for the attacker to access them if they were indeed
trying to steal information by placing them in highly con-
spicuous directories and by giving them enticing names. With
this approach, we were able to improve the accuracy of our
detector. Crafting the decoys on demand improves the accuracy
of the detector even further. Combining the two techniques,
and having the decoy documents act as an oracle for our
detector when abnormal user behavior is detected may lower
the overall false positive rate of detector.
We trained eighteen classifiers with computer usage data
from 18 computer science students collected over a period of
4 days on average. The classifiers were trained using the search
behavior anomaly detection described in a prior paper [9]. We
also trained another 18 classifiers using a detection approach
that combines user behavior profiling with monitoring access
to decoy files placed in the local file system, as described
above. We tested these classifiers using simulated masquerader
data. Figure 1 displays the AUC scores achieved by both
detection approaches by user model1. The results show that the
models using the combined detection approach achieve equal
or better results than the search profiling approach alone.
Fig. 1. AUC Comparison By User Model for the Search Profiling and
Integrated Approaches
The results of our experiments suggest that user profiles
are accurate enough to detect unauthorized Cloud access [9].
When such unauthorized access is detected, one can respond
by presenting the user with a challenge question or with a
decoy document to validate whether the access was indeed
unauthorized, similar to how we used decoys in a local file
setting, to validate the alerts issued by the anomaly detector
that monitors user file search and access behavior.
III. CONCLUSION
In this position paper, we present a novel approach to
securing personal and business data in the Cloud. We propose
monitoring data access patterns by profiling user behavior
to determine if and when a malicious insider illegitimately
accesses someone’s documents in a Cloud service. Decoy
documents stored in the Cloud alongside the user’s real
data also serve as sensors to detect illegitimate access. Once
unauthorized data access or exposure is suspected, and later
verified, with challenge questions for instance, we inundate the
malicious insider with bogus information in order to dilute
the user’s real data. Such preventive attacks that rely on
disinformation technology, could provide unprecedented levels
of security in the Cloud and in social networks.
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